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Abstract. Smart environments integrate Information and Communica-
tion Technologies (ICT) into devices, vehicles, buildings and cities to
offer an increased quality of life, energy efficiency and economical sus-
tainability. In this perspective, the individual has a core role and so has
networking, which enables such entities to cooperate. However, the huge
amount of sensitive data, social aspects and the mixed set of protocols
offer many opportunities to inject hazards, exfiltrate information, mass
profiling of citizens, or produce a new wave of attacks. This work re-
views the major risks arising from the usage of ICT-techniques for smart
environments, with emphasis on networking. Its main contribution is to
explain the role of different stakeholders for causing a lack of security
and to envision future threats by considering human aspects.
Keywords: privacy, security, steganography, smart buildings, human
aspects.
1 Introduction
Smart buildings are an elementary component of smart environments, which
aim at improving the comfort of individuals and their lifestyle. In essence, they
integrate Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) into devices, ve-
hicles and buildings to provide a higher quality of life, a reduced environmental
footprint and economical benefits. Pushed to the limit, such basic blocks can
be arranged to produce large-scale deployments known as smart cities. Smart
environments are the result of a large interdisciplinary effort, ranging from civil
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engineering to cloud computing. However, in this work we focus on network-
ing/devices, since they provide many important features such as: i) the ability
of collecting information from the surrounding environment, ii) the possibility
of sending remotely commands and feedback, also in a real-time fashion, iii) the
availability of an infrastructure to handle the resulting amount of data. Prime
examples are, among the others: wireless loops used to gather information from
sensors, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) deployed to monitor the status
of a physical area, and the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm to access and
control devices or assets like locks, light and household appliances [23].
Alas, smart technologies are tightly coupled with individuals, especially in
terms of their lifestyles, bad habits and sensitive data. Therefore, all the infor-
mation gathered, exchanged and stored within smart environments can lead to
severe issues in terms of security and privacy. For instance, detailed personal in-
formation can be used for mass profiling or social engineering attacks. Moreover,
misuse of devices, bad habits and poor understanding of handled technology can
lead to severe security breaches. For example, smartphones are often used to con-
trol different parts of smart environments (e.g., buildings) and worms or infected
applications could attack the discovered appliances of the user’s environment.
In this perspective, this paper analyzes the most relevant security and privacy
threats of users in smart environments. Given the example of smart building
security, we highlight the practical background which leads to a lack of security
functionality and awareness at the side of vendors, integrators and operators.
The main contributions of this paper are the following: the systematic review
of hazards rooted within the most relevant smart paradigms; an assessment of
emerging threats arising by the mix of ICT technologies and human aspects; the
discussion of possible countermeasures to mitigate identified security issues. We
point out that this paper serves as an introductory work for the HAS session on
Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy and Trust for Smart Buildings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the
problem space generated by the smart paradigm. Section 3 deals with human
aspects of insecurity of smart buildings, Section 4 concentrates on smartphones,
and Section 5 reviews vehicles. Section 6 proposes a role-based perspective on
threats related to smart environments and Section 7 gives our future vision of
identified threats and possible countermeasures. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Description of the Problem Space
Smart environment is an umbrella term comprising different kinds of devices or
specific deployments. As today, the most relevant areas of smart things are:
– Smart Buildings: they collate a mix of smart devices as to produce an
integrated environment. For such a complex deployment, proper middleware
in charge of offering a coherent access is usually adopted, as well as proper
computing facilities to store user data, process control directives and provide
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optimizations, especially in the field of energy management. Thus, this sce-
nario can be used to exploit data hiding, for instance to covertly orchestrate
a botnet.
– Smart Devices: they are quickly becoming widespread and one of the core
blocks to pursue the vision of a more “human-centric” environment. Common
examples of smart devices are gaming consoles, set-top-boxes, light bulbs
and household appliances. These devices can be used to infer habits, even
political views, for instance by evaluating the shows watched on the TV.
Moreover, the availability of full-featured TCP/IP stacks can be exploited
to produce new types of botnets in order to e.g. amplify spam campaigns. It
must be emphasized that smart devices will not be investigated in details in
this paper due to space limitations and their technical heterogeneity.
– Smart Phones: are the most popular tools used to interact with other
devices, and can be used to remotely control buildings and vehicles. In ad-
dition, they are the preferred platform to connect to the Internet and to
communicate using heterogeneous networks (e.g., cellular or WiFi). They
store a huge source of sensitive details such as messages and contacts and
can be paired with smart watches which increases their potential to collect
personal data. As a result, they are one of the preferred targets for data ex-
filtration of users, while additionally empowering phishing, social phishing,
cyber bullying and social engineering [4].
– Smart Vehicles: modern automotives offer features to geolocate vehicles,
mainly through the Global Positioning System (GPS), and to plan routes.
Such features are not only used by individuals, since they are at the ba-
sis of fleet management and intelligent/smart transportation services. Also,
modern vehicles can remotely send telemetry data as to prevent fault and
guarantee proper service levels, e.g., for goods delivery. This allows massive
user profiling, which leads to understand habits to conduct physical attacks.
The resulting problem space is very composite and needs a thorough under-
standing of all the technical components used, both to evaluate the degree of
(in)security and to engineer proper countermeasures and mitigation techniques.
To this aim, functional entities needing an investigation are: i) wireless networks
(e.g., the IEEE 802.11) as well as the core protocols used to exchange data or
grant human interaction (e.g., HTTP); ii) elaborate a proper taxonomy/ranking
to understand where the related weaknesses impact more (e.g., physical security
vs. cybersecurity); iii) understand how sensitive data can be used also jointly
with those available on Online Social Networks (OSNs) as a method to produce
a new wave of attacks; iv) understand why standard detection methods can be
defeated by the complexity and diversity of smart environments.
3 Smart Buildings
Smart buildings are automated buildings, i.e., those comprising Building Au-
tomation Systems (BAS) and inter-connected with the IoT. The importance of
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BAS for today’s societies increases steadily due to various reasons. For instance,
being enriched with more features, buildings can perform an additional number
of routine tasks such as energy saving and in the context of an aging society,
smart buildings ensure that elders can stay longer in their homes before being
forced to move to a nursing home.
Various vulnerabilities in the available standards of communication protocols
used in BAS are known. Most of these communication protocols, e.g., EIB/KNX,
LON or BACnet, were designed many years ago with very limited focus on IT
security [11,12]. Improved standards for the most-widely used BAS protocols
are already proposed or under development, however, the application of these
enhanced protocols in practice and the integration into products is currently not
present. Moreover, the integration of newer protocols into legacy BAS environ-
ments is hardly feasible and thus, novel solutions like traffic normalization must
be applied which protect legacy systems [25]. From a human-oriented perspec-
tive, the major attacks which can be performed on buildings are:
– Surveillance: as shown in [20,26], it is technically feasible to perform surveil-
lance of events in buildings, e.g., caused by inhabitants or employees. There-
fore, passive and active attacks are known: the attacker either exploits side
channels or directly requests sensor values from Internet-connected BAS.
An attacker can, for instance, use surveillance to monitor the behavior of
inhabitants or employees.
– Remote control: while surveillance relies on sensor values and actuator
states in a smart building, a remote control is feasible, too. Therefore, actu-
ators are used to perform actions, triggered by the attacker. For instance, to
break into a building, a thief can send commands to window actuators/door
actuators and can attack the physical access control system. In worst case,
remote control attacks influence the safety of inhabitants and people working
in a building.
– Physical exploitation: being a form of remote control, an attacker can
at least indirectly get advantage of exploiting the BAS of other households.
For illustration, we use the example of a house with two parties A and B,
each possessing its own flat and own BAS. Imagine party A leaves his flat,
which is underneath the flat of B, for winter holidays while party B is staying
at home. Since the ceiling of A’s flat is the ground floor of B’s flat, B can
attack the BAS of A to maximize the heating level in A’s flat. As a result,
the temperature of B’s flat is also heated a little what saves heating costs
for B while increasing the costs for A.
– Availability: the functioning of a building is essential for today’s organi-
zations. Hence, causing a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, e.g., by simple
misconfiguration, can affect all areas of building automation, such as phys-
ical access control or fire alarm systems, and is thus not only harmful for
enterprise processes but for the safety of people.
– Smart Building Botnets: when surveillance or remote control is not only
performed for a single household or industrial building, but for a larger num-
ber of buildings, novel scenarios emerge. So-called smart building botnets can
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perform mass surveillance and mass remote control [27]. For instance, a local
oil distributor may rise his sales by slightly increasing the nightly heating
levels of his customer’s households. Such large-scale attacks potentially in-
fluence the privacy, safety, and living of inhabitants and employees in whole
regions.
4 Smart Phones
For years, smartphones have been one of the most important tools to communi-
cate and store personal data. Recently, the advent of frameworks for managing
home appliances, monitoring the health of the owner and handling payments,
led to an important paradigm shift. In essence, smartphones are the preferred
dashboard to access smart homes, and interact with appliances or vehicles. In
addition, the security is under the responsibility of the user, since he/she is in
charge of managing the administration and installation of the applications, as
well as of undertaking security decisions. Yet, there is not any guarantee about
his/her level of technical knowledge, which makes the human an effective vector
of attack. As a consequence, smartphones are prone to different attacks in terms
of human aspects, specifically:
– Data exfiltration: capturing user’s personal data is one of the primary
goals of attackers [8]. After collecting the data, for instance via phishing, the
malware uploads it to a remote server. Thus, personal or business information
is not only stolen but also stored in a place inaccessible for the user.
– Exploitation of acquired resources: a classical secondary goal consists
of exploiting the controlled smartphone [8]. For example, it can be used as:
a client of a botnet network, to send premium-rate SMS, or to participate
in computations for mining bitcoins. From the user perspective, it disturbs
the normal behavior of the smartphone and can result in additional cost.
As other smart entities can be controlled by an application on the user’s
smartphone, compromising the smartphone can also give a fresh starting
point to attack other smart entities on the same network.
– Surveillance: a malware can try to access user’s localization and report
these data to the attacker. Using the collected positions, more complex at-
tacks can succeed to infer the identity of the user [10].
– Battery drain: a severe fragility of smartphones is the intrinsic power lim-
itation due to the usage of battery. Hence, its malicious depletion can be
at the basis of a new kind of DoS attack, where the device is made unus-
able [17]. Possible mechanisms range from the injection of energy wasting
code within a malware or a stimulation of the device via its air interfaces. In
any case, this attack may isolate the victim, making communications with
the rest of the world infeasible. This kind of hazard is also effective for the
case of sensors or nodes of an IoT deployment and the victim could have
his/her safety framework compromised.
– Information hiding: as a consequence of a full implementation of the
TCP/IP protocol stack, and the diffusion of BAS over IP solutions, modern
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smartphones run several applications using a very mixed set of protocols. The
latter can be exploited for information hiding purposes. In essence, multime-
dia data and network traffic can be used as legitimately appearing carriers
by information hiding techniques to make a third-party observer unaware of
the resulting flow. This technique can be also used for mass-profiling [28] or
for empowering malware exfiltrating data [18].
5 Smart Vehicles
The most useful scenario envisaged for smart vehicles concerns Vehicular Ad-hoc
Networks (VANETs), which offer features such as, road safety, route planning,
entertainment, tolling, traffic management and support for intelligent trans-
portation. In such a deployment, humans should be not endangered by vehicles
as a vehicle’s misbehavior can lead to severe injuries and safety hazards6,7. In
addition, the cooperative nature of VANETs puts the network in a central and
critical role. Therefore, networking technologies used in vehicles must be pro-
tected against malicious activities, which are very effective [13,6]. Their main
scopes are to propagate incorrect information about events on the road, to gain
sensitive information, and to disrupt the network infrastructure to prevent users
accessing the service [14]. Among the others, the most relevant attacks in terms
of human aspects are:
– Injecting bogus information: an attacker deliberately injects false infor-
mation into the network to produce arbitrary situations along a route [1]. As
an example, a node sending false information to benefit from a reduction of
traffic along a common path. This can be done via false information report-
ing traffic jams, road accidents, and blocked routes as to suggest alternative
ways. The most popular methods to achieve such goals are: intentionally
creating or modifying existing frames, repeating previously captured data
(replay attack), and misleading vehicle’s sensors (illusion attack).
– Sybil attack: it is based on spoofing the identity of nodes to flood the
network with incorrect information [29]. Typically, the attacker produces
multiple copies of false data to appear as legitimate. Then, such false data
can be used to induce the same reactions previously explained.
– Wormhole attacks: it creates a tunnel between two attackers’ vehicles as
a way to inject false information and disrupt the vehicular network [1]. The
wormhole attack can be especially dangerous since it makes routing tables
incoherent, thus causing the unavailability of the service for humans.
6 Def Con 21 talk by C. Miller and C. Valasekentitled entitled “Adventures in Au-
tomotive Networks and Control Units” https://www.defcon.org/html/defcon-21/dc-
21-speakers.html#Miller
7 Def Con 18 talk by M. Metzger entitled “Letting the Air Out of Tire
Pressure Monitoring Systems” https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-18/dc-18-
presentations/Metzger/DEFCON-18-Metzger-Letting-Air-Out.pdf
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– Routing protocols attacks: vehicular networks use a mixed amount of
broadcast and multi-hop traffic, e.g., to deliver data to isolated nodes. In
this case, the injection of bogus routing information can cause the routing
protocols to misbehave [24,16]. This may lead to the extension of packets’
routes, the creation of routing loops, or the redirection of the traffic to an
unreal node (blackhole attacks) or towards the attacker (greyhole attacks).
– Man in the middle attacks: there are no significant differences between
Man in the middle attacks in VANETs and in typical wired networks. These
attacks impact the authenticity of transmitted information which may threaten
the privacy and identity of users.
– DDoS attacks: two main techniques are utilized to perform DoS attacks
[29]. First, by disrupting the frequencies utilized for wireless communication,
the attacker produces a jam in a given frequency range. This is quite easy to
implement and its effectiveness mainly depends on the transmitting power of
the jamming device. Second, by sending large amounts of network traffic by
an authorized host, the attacker generates network messages that are valid
but with high volumes/rates thus causing congestion, latency and intermit-
tent connectivity. In both cases, the vehicle is unable to send/receive any
information and the driver could potentially miss an important announce-
ment, e.g. on the accident nearby or the worsening of weather conditions.
– GPS spoofing: it is based on sending a “louder” GPS signal to hide the
legitimate one [29]. Current protection methods are mainly based on mon-
itoring the power expected by a legitimate GPS satellite. This attack may
lead to a car accident or to driving a vehicle in an abandoned area.
6 Human Awareness of Smart Environment’s Threats: a
Role-based Perspective
When comparing human aspects of ICT-related topics with those in smart en-
vironments, a clear difference can be recognized. In ICT-related areas, a strong
development of security features is achieved. Thus, vendors integrate security
into their products and customers clearly demand for such features. In smart
environments, especially the classic ones – such as factory automation – there is
a clear lack of security, which we mainly illustrate in this section by reviewing
the point of view of the different actors in the case of BAS. Most of these views
were obtained owing to personal conversation with the different stakeholders.
Vendors. Vendors do not integrate security into their automation equipment
as they lack know-how. They focus on engineering aspects and product quality
is rather measured in longevity of components instead of in terms of security.
When security features are integrated, these are in many cases implemented
from scratch. For instance, a number of German BAS vendors promote their
BAS network components explicitly with the “feature” that instead of buying
a network stack from a country abroad, they have one competent engineer who
implemented the stack himself. A one-person implementation of a network stack,
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such as BACnet, including its complex features is hardly feasible in a secure way
by a single engineer.
Customers. On the other hand, the customers lack security awareness as well.
Awareness-raising processes are currently taking place on a regional, national,
and international scale. For instance, the 28th German GLT Anwendertagung –
a leading event for professional customers – organized a security session on BAS
in 2014. However, the effect of these awareness raising processes is small. For
this reason, possessing still no (or very limited) awareness for security threats,
customers do not demand security features from vendors, which, in turn, see the
implementation of additional security features as costly.
Operators. Operators of smart buildings are usually janitors without any know-
how on the IT security of their BAS. Even if the operators received additional
education on BAS (e.g., certificates on building management), these courses lack
any security features. The perspective of an operator is to ensure the functioning
of a BAS, including its safe operation, for instance an intact fire alarm system,
but security aspects are considered an additional overhead.
Additionally, vendors provide no tools to monitor or configure the security
of BAS components and thus, even if operators would possess knowledge on IT
security, they could not apply it in practice. In particular, as smart environments
are in most cases networked environments, operators require cyber situational
awareness [9], for example the awareness of any kind of suspicious activity taking
place in cyberspace. In various cases, such as larger or inter-connected BAS, the
number of events cannot be processed by human operators without any support.
To this end, research came up with visualization approaches, which, for instance,
present information in such a way that events with higher entropy are easier to
spot. However, in practice, these tools are not available and if available are used
for spotting misconfiguration problems or malfunctioning equipment instead of
detecting cyber security-related attacks.
Project deployment. Construction of a BAS suffers from non-optimized informa-
tion exchange of the parties involved in the design, construction, and operation
process of a building [21], which includes the planning, integration, and operation
of a BAS. Moreover, know-how about the operation must be managed, including
to consider its potential loss if operators leave the organization—a problem that
is even more important for other critical smart areas such as operator centers
for naval vessels or railways [3].
This analysis is particularly pessimistic for BAS. Other smart components
considered in this paper have made better security efforts. We summarize human
awareness from a security perspective for each “component” of the smart envi-
ronment in Table 1. Smartphones have received better attention than vehicles
or devices. They benefit from two effects: customers ask for more security be-
cause of the increasing connectivity with OSNs; vendors can integrate adapted
security technologies that have been matured for GNU/Linux operating systems,
especially since Android has taken the lead in the market.
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Table 1. Summary of human awareness from a role-based perspective for each ”com-
ponent” of smart environment.
Smart “component” Vendors Customers Operators Deployment
Buildings Low Low Low Low
Vehicles Medium Low Low Low
Phones High Medium High Medium
Devices Medium Low Low Low
7 Future Vision on Threats and Countermeasures
Today, a number of the attacks presented in previous sections, e.g., smart build-
ing botnets, should rather be considered technically feasible than a real-world
threat. However, given the linked risks for individuals and communities and the
lack of awareness of the involved roles, the hurdles for attackers are considered
not higher than for other ICT attacks. For this reason and since smart things
of each type quickly gain more widespread, authors who discussed the particu-
lar attacks conclude the importance of a rapid countermeasure development as
potential attacks are known before emerging on a larger scale in practice (e.g.
[27]).
7.1 Future Threats
The potential of attacks can be considered larger if already known attacks from
other areas of IT security are getting adapted to smart things. For instance,
watering hole attacks [15] can be adapted to smart buildings/smart phones.
Consider a community that is living in the same building. If an attacker wishes
to access the BAS it is enough for her to infect only one inhabitant’s smartphone
which she uses to control the smart building and eventually other habitants
will be infected. This scenario becomes even more significant as some hotels
announced to enable smartphone-based hotel room access for guests.
In this perspective, smartphones will definitely be one of the preferred play-
grounds to exploit threats. Especially, this is due to the complexity of their secu-
rity policies, which discourages users to analyze and take adequate decisions. In
addition, smartphones possess authentication tools that become of high interest
for attackers.
One of the examples of how future mobile malware can covertly exfiltrate
user’s sensitive data is envisioned in [5]. The proposed steganographic method
takes advantage of the built-in Siri service which has been offered for iPhone/iPad
as a native service from iOS5 in 2011. Siri allows interacting with the iOS-based
device using voice commands. To offload the device, the translation of voice
inputs to text is performed remotely in a server farm operated by Apple. To
this aim, the iPhone/iPad samples the voice, sends it to a remote facility, and
waits for a response containing the recognized text, a similarity score and a time
stamp. This characteristic feature can be exploited by an attacker which could
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produce ad-hoc voice patterns to manipulate the throughput and encode a secret
into its shape. In future, a similar approach can be applied to all services relying
on a massive conversation between the user’s device and similar services in the
cloud like GoogleVoice for Android OS or Cortana for Windows Phone.
For other smart devices, the potential of attack is dramatically increasing.
For example, the Rapid7 company published in 2013 a security report about
several critical vulnerabilities of the UPnP library [19]. These vulnerabilities
affect billions of devices, for example Smart TVs, and gives opportunities to
build attacks and gain root shells on these devices.
Lastly, because smart devices typically reside inside smart buildings, a com-
promised device will help an attacker to attack smart buildings. The attacker
can try to capture data, infer residents habits, such as food products ordered
online (smart fridge) and TV shows watched (smart TV). This can significantly
impact privacy and enable the production of a new wave of extremely precise
(and effective) social engineering attacks.
7.2 Future Countermeasures
A number of futuristic protection approaches for smart things are imaginable.
For smart vehicles, the used protocols should include validation algorithms as it
is clear that there, many potential opportunities arise for an attacker to inject
malicious information. As used protocols should react in a real-time fashion, the
added security should be lightweight and distributed between participants in
order to give robust results. These solutions, reviewed in [7], can be based on
reliable cryptographic key distribution and has been already actively studied for
example for ad-hoc networks. With such tools, the privacy of users should be
guaranteed. Also, they can be based on the reputation systems already deployed
for peer-to-peer architectures.
A mean for smart buildings could be to introduce multilevel security [26].
Such an approach could, for instance, prevent that devices in a storage room
could read sensor values from the management floor of an organizational build-
ing.
For the attack vectors discussed for smartphones, the industry is currently
working on Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) that would introduce a se-
cured trusted space of execution while the regular operating system remains un-
trusted. This way, vendors would be able to split their applications and protect
the critical parts into the smartphone’s TEE [2]. Moreover, malware detection
is one of the hot topics for researchers in mobile security. Nevertheless, current
anti-malware products are easily defeated by transformation techniques of the
malware’s code [22]. Thus, these aspects remain to be addressed.
8 Conclusion
This paper discussed the human-related security and privacy aspects of smart
environments. We highlighted the resulting consequences for humans when vari-
ous attacks on smart buildings, smart phones, and smart vehicles are performed,
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also by emphasizing the role of inter-connected things populating smart cities.
Furthermore, by discussing the example of smart buildings, we conclude that
awareness for smart things is a multifaceted problem. Vendors, customers, and
operators as well as awareness for the deployment process of smart things must
be considered. We pointed out that research efforts have already been started
from smartphones but remain very limited for vehicles, devices and especially
for buildings.
We also conclude that a variety of attacks will be possible in a near future.
Therefore, we underline the importance of a rapid development of proper and
effective countermeasures. Possible countermeasures have to be inspired by the
efforts achieved in other fields like peer-to-peer, ad-hoc networks and regular
computers. The customer’s comprehensiveness of these future security measures
is a central requirement in order to be effective. This is a prime research task
both for the academia and the industry in order to improve the security of smart
environments.
References
1. Al-kahtani, M.: Survey on security attacks in vehicular ad hoc networks (vanets).
In: Signal Processing and Communication Systems (ICSPCS), 2012 6th Interna-
tional Conference on. pp. 1–9 (Dec 2012)
2. Arfaoui, G., Gharout, S., Traore´, J.: Trusted Execution Environments: A look
under the hood. In: The International Workshop on Trusted Platforms for Mobile
and Cloud Computing. pp. 259–266. IEEE Computer Society, Oxford, UK (Apr
2014)
3. Bronkhorst, A., Post, W., te Brake, G.: From human factors to HSI and beyond:
Design of operations centers and control rooms. In: 9th Future Security – Security
Research Conference. pp. 140–146. MEV Verlag (September 2014)
4. Caviglione, L., Coccoli, M.: Privacy problems with web 2.0. Computer Fraud &
Security 2011(10), 16 – 19 (2011)
5. Caviglione L., Mazurczyk W.: Understanding information hiding in iOS. IEEE
Computer magazine (January/February 2015)
6. Checkoway, S., McCoy, D., Kantor, B., et al.: Comprehensive experimental analyses
of automotive attack surfaces. In: Proceedings of the 20th USENIX Conference on
Security. pp. 6–6. SEC’11, USENIX Assoc., Berkeley, CA, USA (2011)
7. Engoulou, R.G., Bellache, M., Pierre, S., Quintero, A.: VANET security surveys.
Computer Communications 44(0), 1 – 13 (2014)
8. Felt, A.P., Finifter, M., Chin, E., Hanna, S., Wagner, D.: A survey of mobile
malware in the wild. In: 1st ACM workshop on Security and privacy in smartphones
and mobile devices. p. 3. ACM Press, New York, New York, USA (Oct 2011)
9. Franke, U., Brynielsson, J.: Cyber situational awareness – a systematic review of
the literature. Computers & Security 46, 18–31 (July 2014)
10. Gambs, S., Killijian, M.O., Nunez del Prado Cortez, M.: De-anonymization attack
on geolocated data. In: Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communi-
cations (TrustCom), 2013 12th IEEE Int. Conf. on. pp. 789–797 (2013)
11. Granzer, W., Kastner, W., Neugschwandtner, G., Praus, F.: Security in networked
building automation systems. In: Factory Communication Systems, 2006 IEEE
International Workshop on. pp. 283–292 (2006)
The final publication is available at link.springer.com
8. CONCLUSION
12. Granzer, W., Praus, F., Kastner, W.: Security in building automation systems.
Industrial Electronics, IEEE Transactions on 57(11), 3622–3630 (November 2010)
13. Koscher, K., Czeskis, A., Roesner, F., Patel, S., Kohno, T., Checkoway, S., McCoy,
D., Kantor, B., Anderson, D., Shacham, H., Savage, S.: Experimental security
analysis of a modern automobile. In: Security and Privacy (S&P), 2010 IEEE
Symposium on. pp. 447–462 (May 2010)
14. Lipin´ski, B., Mazurczyk, W., Szczypiorski, K., S´mietanka, P.: Towards effective
security framework for vehicular ad-hoc networks. In: Proc. of 5th International
Conference on Networking and Information Technology (ICNIT 2014) (2014)
15. Lowe, M.: Defending against cyber-criminals targeting business websites. Network
Security 2014(8), 11–13 (Aug 2014)
16. Lu Chen, Hongbo Tang, J.W.: Analysis of VANET security based on routing pro-
tocol information. In: Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Intelligent Control and Inf. Proc. (2013)
17. Martin, T., Hsiao, M., Ha, D.S., Krishnaswami, J.: Denial-of-service attacks on
battery-powered mobile computers. In: Pervasive Computing and Communications,
2004. PerCom 2004. Proceedings of the Second IEEE Annual Conference on. pp.
309–318. IEEE (2004)
18. Mazurczyk, W., Caviglione, L.: Steganography in modern smartphones and miti-
gation techniques. Communications Surveys Tutorials, IEEE PP(99), 1–1 (2014)
19. Moore, H.: Security Flaws in Universal Plug and Play. Tech. Rep. January, Rapid7
(2013), https://community.rapid7.com/docs/DOC-2150
20. Mundt, T., Kruger, F., Wollenberg, T.: Who refuses to wash hands? privacy issues
in modern house installation networks. In: Proc. 7th Int. Conf. Broadband, Wireless
Computing, Communication and Applications. pp. 271–277 (November 2012)
21. No¨ldgen, M., Bach, A., Heinz, T.: Integration of resilience engineering in the trans-
disciplinary building design process. In: Proc. 9th Future Security – Security Re-
search Conference. pp. 125–132. MEV Verlag (September 2014)
22. Rastogi, V., Chen, Y., Jiang, X.: Evaluating Android Anti-malware against Trans-
formation Attacks. In: 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer
and communications security. pp. 329–334. ACM Press, Hangzhou, China (2013)
23. Snoonian, D.: Smart buildings. Spectrum, IEEE 40(8), 18–23 (Aug 2003)
24. Subir Biswas, Jelena Misic, V.M.: Performance analysis of black hole attack in
vanet. In: Proc. of 31st Int. Conf. Distributed Computing Systems (2011)
25. Szlo´sarczyk, S., Wendzel, S., Meier, M., Schubet, F., Kaur, J.: Towards suppressing
attacks on and improving resilience of building automation systems – an approach
exemplified using BACnet. In: Proc. Sicherheit 2014. pp. 407–418. GI (2014)
26. Wendzel, S., Kahler, B., Rist, T.: Covert channels and their prevention in building
automation protocols - a prototype exemplified using BACnet. In: Proc. 2nd Work-
shop on Security of Systems and Software Resiliency. pp. 731–736. IEEE (2012)
27. Wendzel, S., Zwanger, V., Meier, M., Szlo´sarczyk, S.: Envisioning smart building
botnets. In: Proc. Sicherheit 2014. LNI, vol. 228, pp. 319–329. GI (March 2014)
28. Wendzel, S., Mazurczyk, W., Caviglione, L., Meier, M.: Hidden and uncontrolled–
on the emergence of network steganographic threats. In: ISSE 2014 Securing Elec-
tronic Business Processes, pp. 123–133. Springer (2014)
29. Zeadally, S., Hunt, R., Chen, Y.S., Irwin, A., Hassan, A.: Vehicular ad hoc networks
(VANETS): status, results, andchallenges. Telecommunication Systems 50(4), 217–
241 (2012)
The final publication is available at link.springer.com
